Complete axiomatizations and exponential-time decision procedures are provided for reasoning about knowledge and common knowledge when there are infinitely many agents. The results show that reasoning about knowledge and common knowledge with infinitely many agents is no harder than when there are finitely many agents, provided that we can check the cardinality of certain set differences G − G ′ , where G and G ′ are sets of agents. Since our complexity results are independent of the cardinality of the sets G involved, they represent improvements over the previous results even with the sets of agents involved are finite. Moreover, our results make clear the extent to which issues of complexity and completeness depend on how the sets of agents involved are represented.
Introduction
Reasoning about knowledge and common knowledge has been shown to be widely applicable in distributed computing, AI, and game theory. (See [FHMV95] for numerous examples.) Complete axioms for reasoning about knowledge and common knowledge are well known in the case of a fixed finite set of agents. However, in many applications, the set of agents is not known in advance and has no a priori upper bound (think of software agents on the web or nodes on the Internet, for example); it is often easiest to model the set of agents as an infinite set. Infinite sets of agents also arise in game theory and economics (where reasoning about knowledge and common knowledge is quite standard; see, for example, [Aum76, Gea94] ). For example, when analyzing a game played with two teams, we may well want to say that everyone on team 1 knows that everyone on team 2 knows some fact p, or that it is common knowledge among the agents on team 1 that p is common knowledge among the agents on team 2. We would want to say this even if the teams consist of infinitely many agents. Since economies are often modeled as consisting of infinitely many (even uncountably many) agents, this type of situation arises when economies are viewed as teams in a game.
The logics for reasoning about the knowledge of groups of agents contain modal operators K i (where K i ϕ is read "agent i knows ϕ"), E G (where E G ϕ is read "everyone in group G knows ϕ"), and C G (where C G ϕ is read "ϕ is common knowledge among group G"). The operators E G and C G make perfect sense even if we allow the sets G to be infinite-their semantic definitions remain unchanged. If the set of agents is finite, so that, in particular, G is finite, there is a simple axiom connecting E G ϕ to K i ϕ, namely, E G ϕ ⇔ ∧ i∈G K i ϕ. Once we allow infinite groups G of agents, there is no obvious analogue for this axiom. Nevertheless, in this paper, we show that there exist natural sound and complete axiomatizations for reasoning about knowledge and common knowledge even if there are infinitely many agents.
It is also well known that if there are finitely many agents, then there is a decision procedure that decides if a formula ϕ is satisfiable (or valid) that runs in time exponential in |ϕ|, where ϕ is the length of the formula viewed as a string of symbols. We prove a similar result for a language with infinitely many agents. However, two issues arise (that, in fact, are also relevant even if there are only finitely many agents, although they have not been considered before):
• In the statement of the complexity result in [FHMV95] , E G and C G are both viewed as having length 2 + 2|G| (where |G| is the cardinality of G). Clearly we cannot use this definition here if we want to get interesting complexity results, since |G| may be infinite. Even if we restrict our attention to finite sets G, we would like a decision procedure that treats these sets in a uniform way, independently of their cardinality. Here we view E G as having length 1 and C G as having length 3, independent of the cardinality of G. (See, for example, the proof of Proposition 3.5 for the role of independence and the definition of Sub(ϕ) in the proof of Theorem 4.5 for an indication as to why C G has length 3 rather than 1.) Even with this definition of length, we prove that the complexity of the satisfiability problem is still essentially exponential time. ( We discuss below what "essentially" means.) Thus our results improve previously-known results even if there are only finitely many agents.
• In the earlier proofs, it is implicitly assumed that the sets G are presented in such a way that there is no difficulty in testing membership in G. As we show here, in order to decide if certain formulas are satisfiable, we need to be able to test if certain subsets of agents of the form G 0 − (G 1 ∪ . . . ∪ G k ) are empty, where G 0 , . . . , G k are sets of agents. In fact, if we are interested in a notion of knowledge that satisfies positive introspection-that is, if agent i knows ϕ, then she knows that she knows it-then we also must be able to check whether such subsets are singletons. And if we are interested in a notion of knowledge that satisfies negative introspection-that is, if agent i does not know ϕ, then she knows that she does not know it-then we must be able to check whether such subsets have cardinality m, for certain finite m. The difficulty of deciding these questions depends in part on how G 0 , . . . , G k are presented and which sets of agents we can talk about in the language. For example, if G 0 , . . . , G k are recursive sets, deciding if G 0 − (G 1 ∪ . . . ∪ G k ) is nonempty may not even be recursive. Here, we provide a decision procedure for satisfiability that runs in time exponential in |ϕ| provided that we have oracles for testing appropriate properties of sets of the form G 0 − (G 1 ∪ . . . ∪ G k ). Moreover, we show that any decision procedure must be able to answer the questions we ask. In fact, we actually prove a stronger result, providing a tight bound on the complexity of deciding satisfiability that takes into account the complexity of answering questions about the cardinality of
Again, this issue is of significance even if there are only finitely many agents. For example, in the SDSI approach to security [RL96] , there are names, which can be viewed as representing sets of agents. SDSI provides a (nondeterministic) algorithm for computing the set of agents represented by a name. If we want to make statements such as "every agent represented by name n knows ϕ" (statements that we believe will be useful in reasoning about security [HvdM99, HvdMS99] ) then the results of this paper show that to decide validity in the resulting logic, we need more than just an algorithm for resolving the agents represented by a given name. We also need algorithms for resolving which agents are represented by one name and not another. More generally, if we assume that we have a separate language for representing sets of agents, our results characterize the properties of sets that we need to be able to decide in order to reason about the group knowledge of these agents.
In the next section, we briefly review the syntax and semantics of the logic of common knowledge. In Section 3 we state the main results and prove them under some simplifying assumptions that allow us to bring out the main ideas of the proof. We drop these assumptions in Section 4, where we provide the proofs of the full results.
Syntax and Semantics: A Brief Review
Syntax: We start with a (possibly infinite) set A of agents. Let G be a set of nonempty subsets of A. (Note that we do not require G to be closed under union, intersection, or complementation; it can be an arbitrary collection of subsets.) We get the language L C G (Φ) by starting with a set Φ of primitive propositions, and closing under ∧, ¬, and the modal operators K i , for i ∈ A, and E G , C G , for G ∈ G. Thus, if p, q ∈ Φ, i ∈ A, and G, G ′ ∈ G, then
G be the sublanguage of L C G that does not include the C G operators. Let |ϕ| be the length of the formula viewed as a string of symbols, where the modal operators K i and E G are counted as having length 1 and C G is counted as having length 3 (even if G is an infinite set of agents) and all primitive propositions are counted as having length 1.
In [FHMV95, HM92] , A is taken to be the set {1, . . . , n}; in [HM92] , G is taken to be the singleton {{1, . . . , n}} (so that we can only talk about every agent in A knowing ϕ and common knowledge among the agents in A), while in [FHMV95] , G is taken to consist of all nonempty subsets of A.
Semantics: As usual, formulas in L C G are either true or false at a world in a Kripke structure. Formally, a Kripke structure M over A and Φ is a tuple (S, π, {K i : i ∈ A}), where S is a set of states or possible worlds, π associates with each state in S a truth assignment to the primitive propositions in Φ (so that π(s) : Φ → {true, false}), and K i is a binary relation on S for each agent i ∈ A. We occasionally write K i (s) for {t : (s, t) ∈ K i }.
We define the truth relation |= as follows: (M, s) |= p (for p ∈ Φ) iff π(s)(p) = true (M, s) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff both (M, s) |= ϕ and (M, s) |= ψ (M, s) |= ¬ϕ iff (M, s) |= ϕ (M, s) |= K i ϕ iff (M, t) |= ϕ for all t ∈ K i (s) (M, s) |= E G ϕ iff (M, s) |= K i ϕ for all i ∈ G (M, s) |= C G ϕ iff (M, s) |= E k G ϕ for k = 1, 2, 3, . . ., where E k G is defined inductively by taking
It is easy to see that E follows from E1 and E2 (in the presence of Prop and MP) and every instance of E1 and E2 follows from E if A is finite. E is used instead of E1 and E2 in [FHMV95, HM92] . Note that E2 is recursive iff deciding if G− (A ′ ∪ (∪G ′ )) = ∅ is recursive. (We determine precisely which such questions we must be able to answer in Proposition 3.3.)
E3 and EGen are the obvious analogues of K1 and KGen for E G . We do not need them in the case that A is finite; it is easy to see that they follow from K1, KGen, and E. In the case that A is infinite, however, they are necessary.
Axiom E4 is sound in M r
A , M rt A , M rst A , and M elt A . It is easy to see that E4 follows from K2, E1, and EGen, so will not be needed in systems that contain these axioms. Moreover, it is not hard to show that E4 follows from E1, E2, and K5 if the set of agents is finite. However, it does not follow from these axioms if the set of agents is infinite.
Axiom E5 follows from K2 and E1. Moreover, we use it only in systems that already include K2 and E1. Nevertheless, for technical reasons, it is useful to list it separately. Similarly, it is not hard to see that E7 is a derivable rule in any system that includes Prop, MP, K1, K3, E1, E4, and EGen (we prove this in Section 4.4). While we use E7 only in such systems, like E5, it is useful to list it separately.
Axiom E6 (with E G replaced by K i ) is the standard axiom used to characterize symmetric K i relations [FHMV95] . It follows easily from K2, K5, E1, and E2 if A is finite. However, like E4, it must be specifically included if A is infinite.
Finally, we have the following well-known axiom and inference rule for common knowledge:
Historically, in the case of one agent, the system with axioms and rules Prop, K1, MP, and KGen has been called K; adding K2 to K gives us T; adding K4 to T gives us S4; adding K5 to S4 gives us S5; replacing K2 by K3 in S5 gives us KD45. We use the subscript G to emphasize the fact that we are considering systems with sets of agents coming from G rather than only one agent and the superscript C to emphasize that we add E1-E3, EGen, C1, and RC1 to the system. In this way, we get the systems K C G , T C G , and S4 C G . Thus, K C G consists of Prop, K1, MP, KGen, E1, E2, E3, EGen, C1, and RC1; we get S4 C G by adding K2 and K4 to K C G . We get KD45 C G by adding K3-K5 and E4 to K C G and we get S5 C G by adding K2, K4, K5 and E6 to K C G . One of the two main results of this paper shows that each of these axiom systems is sound and complete with respect to an appropriate class of structures. For example, K C G is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M A and S5 C G is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M rst A . In the case that A is finite, this result is well known (see [FHMV95, HM92] -as mentioned earlier, E is used in the axiomatization instead of E1-E3 and EGen). What is perhaps surprising is that E1-E3 and EGen suffice even if A is infinite. For example, suppose that G just consists of the singleton A. In that case, E2 becomes vacuous. Thus, while the axioms force E A ϕ to imply that each agent in A knows ϕ, we have no way of expressing the converse. Indeed, it is easy to construct a structure for the axioms with the standard interpretations of all the K i relations but a nonstandard one of E A , where all the agents in A know ϕ and yet E A ϕ does not hold. Consider, for example, a structure with a single state s for the language with an infinite set A of agents. Suppose that every primitive proposition p is true at s, K i is empty for all i ∈ A, and K i is interpreted in the usual way for all i ∈ A (so that K i ϕ is true at s for all formulas ϕ). For E A , however, we say that E A ϕ holds at s if and only if it is provable in, say, K C G . Of course, there are obviously standard models in which E A p does not hold and so (by the soundness of the axioms for standard interpretations) E A p is not provable. Thus, in this interpretation, E A p does not hold at s while K i p does for every i ∈ A. Finally, it is clear that all the axioms of K C G are true in this structure. Similar examples can be given to show that E4 and E6 do not follow from the specified other axioms when the set of agents is infinite.
The Main Results and a Proof in a Simplified Setting
In this section, we state the two main results of this paper-complete axiomatizations and decision procedures. We then provide a proof of a simpler version of these results that illustrates some of the main ideas. We first state the completeness results. Before stating the results regarding complexity, we first show that questions about certain facts regarding sets of the form G 0 − (G 1 ∪ . . . ∪ G k ) are reducible to satisfiability. We are not just interested in sets of the form
For example, when dealing with M rt , it turns out that we are interested in sets H of this form if |H| = 1. But if H 1 is such a set, then we are also interested in sets of the form
And if |H 2 | = 1, then we can also include H 2 in the union, and so on. The following definition makes this precise. 
For uniformity, we take
Let J * be the algebra generated by J (that is, the Boolean combinations of sets in J ). It is useful to talk about the length of a description of various sets in J * (particularly those in J m for some m). Formally, we assume we have a language whose primitive objects consist of the elements of J and the symbols ∪ and − (for set difference). The length of a description is then the number of symbols of J that appear in it. Notice that, in general, an element of J * may have several different descriptions. We are not always careful to distinguish a set from its description. (We hope that the reader will be able to tell which is intended from context.) We use l(G) to denote the length of the description of G ∈ J * . Let G A = G ∪ {{i} : i ∈ A}. Throughout the paper (and, in particular, in the proof of the next proposition), for ease of exposition, we identify E {i} with K i , for i ∈ A (which allows us to write E G for each G ∈ G A ).
Proposition 3.3:
(a) The question of whether (c) For all m ≥ 1, the question of whether
, given G, we construct two formulas ϕ G,p and ψ G with the following properties.
• ϕ G,p is satisfiable iff |G| > 0.
• If (M, s) |= ϕ G,p , then (M, s) |= ¬K j p for some j ∈ G.
• ψ G is satisfiable iff |G| > 1.
• |ϕ G,p | and |ψ G | are both linear in l(G).
This, of course, suffices to prove the result.
We construct the formulas ϕ G,p by induction on the least h such that G = G ′ − ∪H and H ⊆ (G A ) 1 h . (We are here thinking of G as specified by its description.
This clearly has the desired properties.
Now suppose that H ⊆ (G A ) 1
h for h ≥ 1. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
where we assume that the sets of primitive propositions that appear in ϕ G j ,p j , j = k ′ + 1, . . . , k, are mutually exclusive and do not include p. 2 Now suppose that ϕ G,p is true at some state s in M ∈ M rt A . Then for some i ∈ G ′ , we
A so that each of the structures M j is embedded in M at (s, t j ) and the relation in K i j in M is the least equivalence relation that makes this true such that (s, t j ) ∈ K i,j . We leave it to the reader to check that we can define an interpretation π ′ with all the required properties. Of course, the fact that ϕ G,p is satisfiable if |G| > 0 is now immediate.
Finally, define ψ G to be ϕ G,p ∧ E G ′ (q ∧ (¬p ⇒ ϕ G,q )), where we assume that the primitive propositions that appear in ϕ G,p and ϕ G,q are disjoint.
We claim that ψ G is not satisfiable if |G| ≤ 1. Clearly it is not satisfiable if |G| = 0, since ϕ G,p is not. So suppose, by way of contradiction, that G = {i} and (M, s) |= ψ G for some M ∈ M rt A . Then, thanks to the properties of ϕ G,p and ϕ G,q , we must have (M, s) |=
It is easy to see that this gives us a contradiction. On the other hand, if |G| > 1, we can construct a structure satisfying ψ G as follows. Suppose that i, j ∈ G and ϕ G,p is of the form
We know that |G k ′ | = · · · = |G k | = 1, so by our previous argument, we can find a structure
Since p does not appear in ϕ G,q , we can assume without loss of generality that (M, s) |= ¬p. Now let M ∈ M rst A be a structure whose state space is S ′ ∪ {s}, where s is a fresh state not in
For part (c), we construct formulas ϕ m,G,p such that
A (and hence also for M ∈ M rst A ), then there exist m + 1 distinct agents i 1 , . . . , i m+1 ∈ G such that (M, s) |= ¬K i j ¬p, j = 1, . . . , m + 1;
We first define an auxiliary family of formulas. If
where p 0 , . . . , p m+1 , q 0 , . . . , q m+1 are fresh primitive propositions distinct from p. Observe that
It is easy to check that the last clause forces q i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, to be equivalent to ¬p i+1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬p m+1 . at least in the worlds G ′ -reachable in one step. Thus, in these worlds, the formulas p i ∧ q i , i = 1, . . . , m + 1, are mutually exclusive.
. To see that these agents i j must be distinct, suppose that i j = i j ′ for j < j ′ . By the Euclidean property, we have (
We leave the details to the reader.
We now construct the formulas ϕ m,G,p by induction on the least h such that
Without loss of generality, we can assume that
Without loss of generality, we can assume that, other than p, the sets of primitive propositions mentioned in the formulas ϕ m j −1,G j ,p are disjoint, and these sets are all disjoint from the set of primitive propositions in ψ m,
The argument that this formula has the required properties is almost identical to that for ψ m,G ′ ,G 1 ,...,G k ,p ; we leave details to the reader.
Finally, for part (d), consider the formula ϕ d defined as
We leave it to the reader to check that
We already saw that for axiom E2 to be recursive, we need to be able to decide whether
Proposition 3.3 shows that if there is no recursive algorithm for answering such questions, the satisfiability problem for the logic (even without C G operators) is also not decidable. For simplicity here, we assume we have oracles that can answer the questions that we need to answer (according to Proposition 3.3) in unit time; we consider the complexity of querying the oracle in more detail in Section 4.5. More precisely, let O m be an oracle that, for a set G ∈ G m A , tells us whether |G| > k, for any k < m. (Thus, queries to oracle O m have the form (G, k).) Let O ′ be an oracle that tells us whether
Theorem 3.4: There is a constant c > 0 (independent of A) and an algorithm that, given Proof: Given ϕ, let G ϕ be the set of subsets G of agents such that E G or C G appears in ϕ.
(Recall that we are identifying K i with E {i} , so that {i} ∈ G ϕ if K i appears in ϕ.) Note that |G ϕ | ≤ |ϕ|.
Clearly there are at most 2 N atoms over G. Let A ′ consist of the nonempty atoms over G ϕ . Note that |A ′ | ≤ 2 |ϕ| . Define σ : A → A ′ by taking σ(i) to be the unique atom over G ϕ containing i. We extend σ to a map from 2 A → 2 A ′ by taking σ(G) = {σ(i) : i ∈ G} (= {H ∈ G ϕ : H ⊆ G}). Translate ϕ to ϕ σ by replacing all occurrences of E G and C G in ϕ by E σ(G) , and C σ(G) , respectively. Clearly |ϕ| = |ϕ σ |. (Note that it is important here that we take the length of E G and C G to be independent of G.)
If ϕ is satisfiable, let (M, s) witness that fact. Convert M into a structure M σ over A ′ with the same state space by setting (s, t) ∈ K A iff (s, t) ∈ ∪ j∈A K j for each A ∈ A ′ . An easy induction shows that for every formula ψ with sets (of agents) chosen from G ϕ , we have (M, s) |= ψ if and only if (M σ , s) |= ψ σ . The only point that needs any comment is that E G (and so also C G ) has the same meaning in M (in terms of reachability) as E σ(G) (C σ(G) ) in M σ , by the definition of σ(G) and the K A relations. Thus (M σ , s) |= ϕ σ as required.
For the other direction, suppose that (M ′ , s) |= ϕ σ for some structure M ′ over A ′ . We define a structure M over A by defining
. Again an easy induction shows that for every formula ψ with sets chosen from G ϕ , (M ′ , s) |= ψ if and only if (M, s) |= ψ σ . Once again, the only point to notice is that E G (and so also C G ) has the same meaning in M ′ (in terms of reachability) as E σ(G) (C σ(G) ) in M by the definition of σ(G) and the relations K j . Thus (M, s) |= ϕ as required.
Corollary 3.6: Given an oracle that decides, for each Boolean combination G of elements in
Proof: Clearly, to check if ϕ is satisfiable, it suffices to check if ϕ σ is satisfiable. In [HM92] , there is an exponential time algorithm for checking satisfiability. However, this algorithm presumes that the set of agents is fixed. A close look at the algorithm actually shows that it runs in time 2 cm|ϕ| , where m is the number of agents. In our translation, the set of agents is exponential in |ϕ|, giving us a double-exponential time algorithm.
Corollary 3.7: If G is closed under intersection and complementation, then K C G is a sound and complete axiomatization for the language L C G with respect to M A .
Proof: Soundness is straightforward, so we focus on completeness. Suppose that ϕ is valid. By Proposition 3.5, so is
We can translate this proof step by step to a proof of ϕ in K C G . We simply replace every formula ψ that appears in the proof of ϕ σ by ψ τ , where ψ τ is obtained by replacing each occurrence of K A in ψ by E A unless A = {i} is a singleton, in which case we replace K A by K i , and replacing each occurrence of E G , and C G in ψ by E ∪G , and C ∪G , respectively. Since we have assumed G is closed under complementation and intersection, it is also closed under union, and hence ψ τ is a formula in L C G . It is easy to check that the translated proof is still a proof over the language L C G : Tautologies become tautologies as (ϕ ∨ ψ) τ = ϕ τ ∨ ψ τ and similarly for negations. Instances of MP in the proof of ϕ σ become instances of MP in the proof of ϕ because (ϕ → ψ) τ = ϕ τ → ψ τ . Instances of KGen in the proof of ϕ σ become instances of EGen or KGen in the proof of ϕ; similarly, instances of K1 are converted to instances of K1 or E1. It is easy to see that instances of E1, E2, E3, EGen, C1, and RC1 are converted to legitimate instances of the same axiom.
While Corollaries 3.6 and 3.7 are close to our desired theorems, they also make clear the difficulties we need to overcome in order to prove Theorems 3.1 and 3.4. Specifically,
• we need to cut the complexity down from double-exponential to single exponential;
• we need to prove completeness without assuming that G is closed under complementation and intersection;
• we want to use an oracle that tests only whether a set of the form
is nonempty, rather than one that applies to arbitrary Boolean combinations;
• we want to extend these results to the case that the K i relations satisfy properties like transitivity.
With regard to the last point, while in general it is relatively straightforward to extend completeness and complexity results to deal with relations that have properties like transitivity, it is not so straightforward in this case. For example, even if M ∈ M rt A , the relations in the structure M σ constructed in Proposition 3.5 are not necessarily transitive. As shown in Proposition 3.3, we need a different oracle to deal with transitivity.
Proving the Main Results
In this section, we prove Theorems 3.1 and 3.4. The structure of the proof is similar to that of Corollaries 3.6 and 3.7; we describe step by step the modifications required to deal with the problems raised in the previous section. It is convenient to split the proof into four cases, depending on the class of structures considered.
The Proof for
In Proposition 3.5 we showed that we could translate a formula ϕ to a formula ϕ σ such that ϕ was satisfiable in M A iff ϕ σ was satisfiable in M A ′ , where A ′ consisted of the atoms over G ϕ . Our goal is to maintain the translation idea, but use as our target set of agents a set whose elements we can determine with the oracles at our disposal (for testing the nonemptiness of certain set differences). As a first step, we try to abstract the key ingredients of Proposition 3.5. Suppose that we have a set A ′ of agents and a partial map σ : A → A ′ . Again, we can extend σ to a map from 2 A to 2 A ′ : σ(G) = {σ(i) : i ∈ G}. Given a formula ϕ, let ϕ σ be the formula that results by replacing all the occurrences of G in ϕ by σ(G). In Proposition 3.5, A ′ is the set of atoms over G ϕ and σ(i) is the unique atom containing i. We were able to show that, for that choice of A ′ and σ, the formulas ϕ and ϕ σ were equisatisfiable. What does it take to obtain such a result in general? The following result shows that we need to be able to find a mapping τ : A ′ → 2 A − {∅} with one key property.
Proposition 4.1: Given a formula ϕ and a partial map
Proof: Given ϕ and σ, suppose there exists a mapping τ with the property above. We show that ϕ and ϕ σ are equisatisfiable.
Notice that the assumed property of τ implies that for all G ∈ G ϕ , we have
An easy induction on the structure of ψ now shows that (M, t) |= ψ if and only if (M ′ , t) |= ψ σ for all t ∈ S and all formulas ψ ∈ L C Gϕ . Also note that if M ∈ M r A , then M ′ ∈ M r A ′ (since the union of reflexive relations is reflexive).
For the opposite direction, suppose
is defined and the empty relation otherwise. Note that for all G ∈ G ϕ we have
Again, an easy induction on the structure of ψ shows that (M, t) |= ψ if and only if (M ′ , t) |= ψ σ for all t ∈ S and all formulas ψ ∈ L C Gϕ . If M ′ ∈ M r A , we modify the construction slightly by taking
it is easy to check that we still have ∪ i∈G K i = ∪ i∈G K σ(i) , so the modified construction works for the reflexive case.
For the mapping σ of Proposition 3.5 we can take τ to be the identity, but this requires an oracle for nonemptiness of atoms. We now show how to choose A ′ and define maps σ and τ in a way that requires only information about whether sets of the form
Definition 4.2: Given a set G of sets of agents and
Note that we can check whether H is a G-maximal subset of G by doing at most |G| tests of the form (G − ∪H ′ ) = ∅, and we can find all pairs (G, H) in R(G ϕ ) by doing at most |G|2 |G|−1 such tests.
The following lemma gives some technical properties of R(G) that will be used frequently.
Part (b) is immediate from part (a), since it is clear that G − ∪H is independent of G and depends only on H.
For part (c), suppose that H = H ′ . Without loss generality, there is some H ∈ H − H ′ . It follows immediately from part (a) that G − ∪H and
H denote the atom associated with H defined in Lemma 4.3(a). It is independent of G by Lemma 4.3(b). We omit G, writing simply A H , when it is clear from the context which set G we have in mind.
We now show how to define a translation satisfying the hypotheses of Proposition 4.1 using the elements of R(G ϕ ) identified according to the second coordinate alone.
Given a formula
as defined after Lemma 4.3) and undefined otherwise. As before, we extend σ 1 to 2 A by defining
Proof: For part (a), first suppose that G / ∈ H and (G ′ , H) ∈ R(G ϕ ) for some G ′ ∈ G ϕ . Then by Lemma 4.3(a), it follows that A H ⊆ G. Since A H = ∅, there is some i ∈ A H . Since i ∈ G and σ 1 (i) = H, it follows that H ∈ σ 1 (G). For the opposite inclusion, suppose that H ∈ σ 1 (G).
For part (b), given G, note that there must be some G-maximal subset H. Thus, (G, H) ∈ R(G ϕ ). Since G − ∪H = ∅, we must have G / ∈ H. By part (a), H ∈ σ 1 (G), so σ 1 (G) = ∅.
For part (c), suppose that H ∈ A ϕ . Then there exists some G such that (G, H) ∈ R(G ϕ ), and
Since |A| ≤ 2 |ϕ| , we have now reduced satisfiability with infinitely many agents to satisfiability with finitely many agents, at least for M A and M r A , using only tests that we know we need to be able to perform in any case. We next must deal with the problem we observed in the proof of Corollary 3.6, that is, there may be exponentially many agents in the subgroups mentioned in ϕ σ 1 . This is done in the following result. In this result, we assume that the complexity of checking whether i ∈ G is no worse than linear in |A|. While we do not assume this in general, it is true for the A ′ and sets G that arise in the translation of Proposition 4.1, which suffices for our application of the result to the proof of Theorem 3.4. Proof: We first present an algorithm that decides if ϕ is satisfiable in M A ; we then show how to modify it to deal with M r A . The algorithm is just a slight modification of standard decision procedures [FHMV95, HM92] . (Far more serious modifications are needed to prove the analogous result for the M rt A , M rst A , and M elt A ; see Theorems 4.9, 4.16, and 4.20.) Let Sub(ϕ) be the set of subformulas of ϕ together with E G (ψ ∧ C G ψ) and ψ ∧ C G ψ for each subformula C G ψ of ϕ. Sub + (ϕ) consists of the formulas in Sub(ϕ) and their negations. An easy induction on |ϕ| shows that |Sub(ϕ)| ≤ |ϕ|, so |Sub + (ϕ)| ≤ 2|ϕ|. (Here we need to use the fact that we take the length of C G to be 3.)
Let S 1 consist of all subsets s of Sub + (ϕ) that are maximally consistent in that (a) for each formula ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ), either ψ ∈ s or ¬ψ ∈ s, (b) they are propositionally consistent (for example, we cannot have all of ψ ∧ ψ ′ , ¬ψ, and ¬ψ ′ in s), and (c) they contain E G (ψ ∧ C G ψ) iff they contain C G ψ. Note that there are at most 2 |ϕ| sets in S 1 (ϕ).
For s ∈ S 1 and G ∈ G A , we define s/E G = {ψ : E G ψ ∈ s} (again, we identify K i with E {i} ). Define s/K i = ∪ i∈G (s/E G ). Define a binary relation K i on S 1 for each i ∈ A by taking (s, t) ∈ K i iff s/K i ⊆ t. We now define a sequence S j of subsets of S 1 . Suppose that we have defined S 1 , . . . , S j . S j+1 consists of all states in S j that seem consistent, in that the following two conditions hold:
1. If ¬E G ψ ∈ s, then there is some t ∈ S j such that (s, t) ∈ ∪ i∈G K i and ¬ψ ∈ t.
2. If ¬C G ψ ∈ s, then there is some t ∈ S j such that t is G-reachable from s in S j and ¬ψ ∈ t.
If S j = S j+1 then we continue the construction. Otherwise the construction terminates; in this case, the algorithm returns "ϕ is satisfiable" if ϕ ∈ s for some state s ∈ S j+1 and returns "ϕ is unsatisfiable" otherwise.
Since S j ⊇ S j+1 , S 1 has at most 2 |ϕ| elements, and there are |A| relations, it is easy to see that the whole procedure can be carried out in time O(|A|2 c|ϕ| ) for some c > 0.
It remains to show that the algorithm is correct. First suppose that ϕ is satisfiable. In that case, (M, s 0 ) |= ϕ for some structure M = (S, π, {K ′ i : i ∈ A}) ∈ M A . We can associate with each state s ∈ S the state s * in S 1 consisting of all the formulas ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ) such that (M, s) |= ψ. It is easy to see that if (s, t) ∈ K ′ i then (s * , t * ) ∈ K i . A straightforward induction shows that the states s * for s ∈ S always seem consistent, and thus are in S j for all j. Moreover, ϕ ∈ s * 0 . Thus, the algorithm declares that ϕ is satisfiable, as desired. Conversely, suppose that the algorithm declares that ϕ is satisfiable. We construct a structure M = (S, π, {K ′ i : i ∈ A}) over A and Φ in which ϕ is satisfied as follows. Let j be the stage at which the algorithm terminates. Let S = S j . Define π so that π(s)(p) = true iff p ∈ s, for s ∈ S and p ∈ Φ. For each i ∈ A, we take K ′ i to be the restriction of K i to S j . A straightforward induction on the structure of formulas shows that for all formulas ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ) and states s ∈ S, we have (M, s) |= ψ iff ψ ∈ s. (The cases for E G ψ and C G ψ use the appropriate clauses of the definition of seeming inconsistent and the choice of j.) Since ϕ ∈ s for some s * ∈ S, it follows that (M, s * ) |= ϕ, so ϕ is satisfiable.
To deal with M r A , the only change necessary is that in going from S 1 to S 2 in the construction, we also eliminate s ∈ S 1 if (s, s) / ∈ K i for some i ∈ A. This guarantees that the K i relations are reflexive. The remainder of the proof goes through unchanged.
Proof of Theorem 3.4 for M A and M r
A : The deterministic exponential time lower bound in Theorem 3.4 follows from the lower bound in the case where A is finite, which is proved in [HM92, Theorem 6.19] using techniques developed by Fischer and Ladner [FL79] for PDL. The sets G that arise in the lower bound proof have cardinality 2, so oracles are of no help here.
For the upper bound, suppose that we are given a formula ϕ. We first compute the set R(G ϕ ). This can be done with at most |ϕ|2 |ϕ| calls to oracle O 0 , since |G ϕ | ≤ |ϕ| and we need only check, for each G ∈ G ϕ and H ⊆ G ϕ , whether G − H = ∅.
Consider the mapping σ 1 of Lemma 4.4. By part (a) of Lemma 4.4, we can compute the formula ϕ σ 1 using ≤ |ϕ|2 |ϕ| calls to oracle O 0 . By Proposition 4.1 and Lemma 4.4, the formulas ϕ and ϕ σ 1 are equisatisfiable. By Theorem 4.5, we can decide if ϕ σ 1 is satisfiable in time O(2 c|ϕ| ) for some c > 0 (since |ϕ σ 1 | = |ϕ| and the set A of agents that appear in ϕ σ 1 has size at most 2 |ϕ| ).
We now want to prove Theorem 3.1 in the case of M A and M r A . The idea is the same as that of Corollary 3.7. If ϕ is valid, then so is ϕ σ 1 . We can then appeal to completeness in the case of finitely many agents to get a proof of ϕ σ 1 that we can then "pull back" to a proof of ϕ. There is only one difficulty that we encounter when trying to put this idea into practice. Exactly how do we pull back the proof? For example, suppose that the proof of ϕ σ 1 involves a formula ψ with an operator K H . In general, there will be many agents i ∈ A such that σ 1 (i) = H. One option is to replace
(This is what was done in the proof of Corollary 3.7.) The problem with this is that there is no guarantee that the resulting set is in G. Alternatively, we could replace K H by K i for some i such that σ 1 (i) = H. But if so, which one?
We actually take the latter course here. We solve the problem of which i to choose by showing that there is a proof of ϕ σ 1 in which the only modal operators that arise in any formula used in the proof are modal operators that appear in ϕ σ 1 (Lemma 4.7). For these operators, there is a canonical way to do the replacement (Lemma 4.6). While it may seem almost trivial that the only operators that should be needed in the proof of ϕ σ 1 are ones that already appear in the formula, this is not the case for the standard completeness proof [FHMV95, HM92] , since in the proof of the validity of a formula of the form E G ψ, the modal operators K i are used for i ∈ G, although these operators may not appear in ψ. It is important that we use the axioms E1 and E2 in doing the proof, rather than the axiom E; otherwise the result would not hold. Indeed, the result does not quite hold in the case of T C G ; we need to augment it with E5. Proof: Suppose that G = G ′ . Without loss of generality, suppose that i ∈ G − G ′ . Then there is a G-maximal set H that includes G ′ . By Lemma 4.4(a), we have H ∈ σ 1 (G). Since G ′ ∈ H, it follows from Lemma 4.4(a) that H / ∈ σ 1 (G ′ ). Thus, σ 1 (G) = σ 1 (G ′ ).
For the next lemma, we write AX ⊢ ϕ ψ if there is a proof of ϕ in AX that involves only modal operators that appear in ϕ. Let (T C G ) + consist of T C G augmented with the axiom E5. Although E5 follows from E1 and K2, using E5 allows us to be able to write proofs of ϕ that use only the modal operators in ϕ.
Lemma 4.7: If A is finite and ϕ ∈ L C G is valid with respect to M A (resp.,
Proof: We first consider the case of M A . Since ϕ is valid, ¬ϕ is not satisfiable. That means, when we apply the construction in the proof of Theorem 4.5 to ¬ϕ, all the sets containing ¬ϕ are eliminated. For each state s ∈ S 1 , let ϕ s be the conjunction of all the formulas in s. We prove the result by showing, by induction on j, that if a state s ∈ S j does not seem consistent, then
To see that (1) suffices to prove the lemma, note that standard propositional reasoning (i.e., using Prop and MP) shows that, for any formula ψ ∈ Sub(¬ϕ),
(Here we need the observation that by C1 and RC1, nothing is lost by our assumption that
) Negating both sides of ⇔, we get
Thus, if K C G ⊢ ϕ ¬ϕ s for each set s containing ¬ϕ, it follows by standard propositional reasoning that K C G ⊢ ϕ ϕ, as desired. While this general approach to proving completeness is quite standard, we must take extra care because of our insistence on restricting to symbols that appear in ϕ, particularly when dealing with the case when a state seems inconsistent due to a formula of the form ¬E G ψ or ¬C G ψ not being satisfied. This is where the axioms E1 and E2 come into play.
To prove (1), we first need a number of basic facts of epistemic logic and some preliminary observations. The basic facts (which are easily proved using Prop, E3 (or K1 when G = {i}), MP, and EGen (or KGen); see [FHMV95, p. 51, 94] 
and
Assume by induction that for all s ∈ S 1 − S j , we have K C G ⊢ ϕ ¬ϕ s . We now show that if s ∈ S j does not seem consistent then K C G ⊢ ϕ ¬ϕ s , by considering in turn each of the two ways s may seem inconsistent. First suppose that s does not seem consistent because ¬E G ψ ∈ s and there is no state t ∈ S j such that (s, t) ∈ ∪ i∈G K i and ¬ψ ∈ t. We show that
Since ¬E G ψ is a conjunct of ϕ s (since ¬E G ψ ∈ s, by assumption), (5) shows that ϕ s is K C Ginconsistent, as desired.
To prove (5), we first show that if G ∈ G ϕ , then
To prove (6), suppose that (s, t) / ∈ ∪ i∈G K i . For each i ∈ G, there must be some G i,t ∈ G ϕ and formula E G i,t θ such that i ∈ G, E G i,t θ ∈ s and ¬θ ∈ t. Since E G i,t θ ∈ s and ¬θ ∈ t it is immediate that K C G ⊢ ϕ ϕ s ⇒ E G i,t θ and K C G ⊢ ϕ θ ⇒ ¬ϕ t . Now applying (4) and propositional reasoning, we get that K C G ⊢ ϕ ϕ s ⇒ E G i,t ¬ϕ t . Since we can find such a G i,t for each i ∈ G, we have that G ⊆ ∪ i∈G G i,t . Since G is finite, by E2, we have K C G ⊢ ϕ ϕ s ⇒ E G ¬ϕ t , as desired. Returning to the proof of (5), note that (since E G ψ ∈ s) if ¬ψ ∈ t then (s, t) / ∈ ∪ i∈G K i . Thus, from (6) and (3), we have
By the induction hypothesis, for all states in t ∈ S 1 − S j , we have that K C G ⊢ ϕ ¬ϕ t . Thus, using (2), we have K
(5) now follows from (4), (7), and (8).
Finally, we must show that if ¬C G ψ ∈ s and there is no state t ∈ S j G-reachable from s in S j such that ¬ψ ∈ t, then K C G ⊢ ϕ ϕ s ⇒ C G ψ, again showing that ϕ s is K C G -inconsistent. This follows by a relatively straightforward modification of the completeness proof given in [FHMV95, HM92] , so we just sketch the details here. Let T 1 = {t ∈ S j : ¬C G ψ ∈ t and there is no state t ′ ∈ S j G-reachable from t in S j such that ¬ψ ∈ t ′ } and T 2 = {t ∈ S j : C G ψ ∈ t}. Let T ′ i consist of those states in T i that also contain ψ, i = 1, 2. Let T = T 1 ∪T 2 and let T ′ = T ′ 1 ∪T ′ 2 . We claim that there is no pair (t, t ′ ) ∈ ∪ i∈G K i such that t ∈ T and t ′ ∈ S j − T ′ . It is immediate that if t ∈ T 2 then (since ψ ∧ C G ψ ∈ t/E G ⊆ t ′ ) t ′ ∈ T ′ 2 . If t ∈ T 1 and t ′ ∈ S j − T ′ , then either ¬ψ ∈ t ′ or ¬C G ψ ∈ t ′ and there is a state t ′′ G-reachable from t ′ in S j such that ¬ψ ∈ t ′′ . This means that either t ′ or t ′′ is a state G-reachable from t in S j containing ¬ψ. This contradicts the fact that t ∈ T 1 .
It now follows from (6) that for all t ∈ T and t ′ ∈ S j − T ′ , we have
Let ϕ T = ∨ t∈T ϕ t and let
It easily follows from (3), (4), and (9) 
Since this is true for all t ∈ T , we have K
By applying RC1 and the fact that s ∈ T , we have
This completes the completeness proof in the case of M A . To deal with M r A , we must just show that if s is eliminated because (s, s) / ∈ K i for some i ∈ A, then T C G ⊢ ϕ ¬ϕ s ; all other cases are identical. But if (s, s) / ∈ K i , then there must be some G and ψ such that i ∈ G, E G ψ ∈ s, and ¬ψ ∈ s. Since (T C G ) + includes the axiom E G ψ ⇒ ψ, we have that (T C G ) + ⊢ ϕ ¬ϕ s , as desired.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 for M A and M r A : We have already observed that the axioms are sound. For completeness, suppose that ϕ is valid with respect to M A . By Proposition 4.1, so is ϕ σ 1 . By Lemma 4.7, there is a proof of ϕ σ 1 in K C Gϕ that mentions only the modal operators in ϕ σ 1 . Given a formula ψ in which the only modal operators that appear are modal operators that appear in ϕ σ 1 (and thus have the form E σ 1 (G) , C σ 1 (G) , and K σ 1 (i) , for sets G and {i} in G ϕ ) let ψ τ 1 be the unique formula all of whose modal operators appear in ϕ such that (ψ τ 1 ) σ 1 = ψ. Lemma 4.6 assures us that ψ τ 1 is well defined. We can pull the proof of ϕ σ 1 back to a proof of ϕ, by replacing each occurrence of a formula ψ in the proof by ψ τ 1 .
The argument for M r
A is identical, except that the proof uses instances of the axiom E5. These can be eliminated by using E1 and K2, as we observed earlier (although now the proof of ϕ may use modal operators K i that do not appear in ϕ).
Dealing with M
rt A Proposition 4.1 as it stands does not hold for M rt A . There is no guarantee that the translated formula is satisfiable in M rt A , even if ϕ is. Indeed, suppose that G is closed under intersection and complementation, so that we can use the function σ of Proposition 3.5. Suppose that ϕ is the formula E G p ∧ ¬E G E G p, where |G| ≥ 2. The formula ϕ σ looks syntactically identical, except that σ(G) is a single agent in A ′ . We cannot make the K G relation transitive and still satisfy ϕ σ . More generally, to deal with M rt A , we must be careful in how we deal with singleton sets.
As a first step, we define mixed structures. Since we also need these to deal with M rst A and M elt A , we define three types of mixed structures at once. We say that a binary relation K is secondarily reflexive [Che80] if (s, t) ∈ K implies (t, t) ∈ K. Let M rt
) consist of structures M = (S, π, {K i : i ∈ A 1 ∪ A 2 }) where the relations K i for i ∈ A 1 are reflexive and transitive (resp., reflexive, symmetric and transitive; Euclidean, serial and transitive) and the relation K i for i ∈ A 2 are reflexive (resp., reflexive and symmetric; serial and secondarily reflexive).
We can now define our translation in the case of M rt A . Although we can in fact get an analogue to Proposition 4.1 for M rt A , it turns out to be easier to provide a translation that combines Proposition 4.1 and Lemma 4.4, rather than separating them. As suggested by Proposition 3.3, the translation involves R(G 1 ϕ ), rather than R(G ϕ ). Given a formula ϕ, let
Since it is easy to see that R(G 1 ϕ ) = R(G ψ ) for some appropriate ψ, it is immediate that Lemma 4.4 applies to σ 2 and τ 2 .
Proposition 4.8: ϕ is satisfiable in M rt
A iff ϕ σ 2 is satisfiable in M rt
Proof: First suppose that (M, s) |= ϕ, where M ∈ M rt A . We convert M = (S, π, {K i : i ∈ A}) into a structure M ′ = (S, π, {K H : H ∈ A ϕ,rt }) as before, by defining K H = ∪{K i : i ∈ τ 2 (H)}. Since Lemma 4.4 applies, the proof that (M ′ , s) |= ϕ is identical to that in Proposition 4.1. We must only show that M ′ ∈ M rt A 1 +A 2 . Since the union of reflexive relations is reflexive, it is immediate that K H is reflexive for H ∈ A 2 . If H ∈ A 1 , then |A H | = 1. Suppose that A H = {i}. We claim that τ 2 (H) = {i}. By construction, {i} ∈ G 1 ϕ . We cannot have {i} ∈ H, since i / ∈ ∪H. Thus {i} ∈ G 1 ϕ − H, so τ 2 (H) = ∩(G 1 ϕ − H) ⊆ {i}. Since τ 2 (H) = ∅ by Lemma 4.4(c), we must have τ 2 (H) = {i}. Thus, K H = K i , so K H is reflexive and transitive.
For the opposite direction we need to work a little harder than before, because we must ensure that all the K i relations are reflexive and transitive for all i ∈ A. Supppose (M, s) |= ϕ σ 2 for some M = (S, π, {K H : H ∈ A ϕ,rt }) ∈ M rt A 1 +A 2 . Let S 0 and S 1 be two disjoint copies of S. For a state s ∈ S, let s i be the copy of s in S i , i = 0, 1. Let M ′ = (S ′ , π ′ , {K i : i ∈ A}) be defined as follows:
• π ′ (s i ) = π(s) for i = 0, 1.
• If σ 2 (i) ∈ A 1 , define K i = {(s i , t j ) : (s, t) ∈ K σ 2 (i) , i, j ∈ {0, 1}}. K i is clearly reflexive and transitive in this case, since K σ 2 (i) is.
• If σ 2 (i) = H ∈ A 2 , note that |A H | ≥ 2. It is immediate from the definition that σ 2 (i) = H for all i ∈ A H . Pick some
Clearly K i is reflexive and transitive.
This construction guarantees that
A straightforward argument by induction on structure now shows that if ψ ∈ L C G 1 ϕ , then the following are equivalent for all t ∈ S:
• both (M ′ , t 0 ) |= ψ and (M ′ , t 1 ) |= ψ,
Of course, the interesting cases are if ψ is of the form K i ψ ′ , E G ψ ′ , or C G ψ ′ . These follow immediately from observations (11) and (12). The next step is to get an analogue of Theorem 4.5 for M rt
. The basic idea of the proof is the same as that of Theorem 4.5. However, in our construction, we need to make the K i relations transitive. To see the difficulty, suppose that ϕ is K 1 p ∧ E G q, where G is a set of agents containing 1. Recall that in Theorem 4.5, states are consistent subsets of Sub + (ϕ). Let s, t, and u be states such that s = {K 1 p, E G q, p, q}, t = {K 1 p, ¬E G q, p, q}, and u = {K 1 p, ¬E G q, p, ¬q}. With our previous construction, we would have both (s, t) ∈ K 1 and (t, u) ∈ K 1 . By transitivity, we should also have (s, u) ∈ K 1 . But since E G q ∈ s and ¬q ∈ u, we have (s, u) / ∈ K 1 . Nevertheless, each of s, t, and u individually seems consistent. Which state should we eliminate in order to preserve transitivity?
To deal with this problem, we need to put more information (i.e., more formulas) into each state. Intuitively, if (s, t) ∈ K i , then we should have K i q ∈ t, because if E G q ∈ s, then K i q should also be in s, as should K i K i q by K4. It would then follow that K i q should be in t. This, in turn, would guarantee that (t, u) / ∈ K i , since q / ∈ u.
What we would like to do now is to augment Sub(ϕ) by including all formulas K i ψ such that E G ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ) and i ∈ G ∩ A 1 . (We restrict to A 1 since these are the only relations that are required to be transitive.) While this approach can be used to force the K i relations to be transitive, the resulting set of formulas can have size O(|A 1 ||ϕ|), which means the resulting state space (the analogue of S 1 ) could then have size 2 |A 1 ||ϕ| . This would not give us the desired complexity bounds. Thus, we must proceed a little more cautiously. 
Proof:
We assume for ease of exposition that A 1 = ∅; we leave the straightforward modification in case A 1 = ∅ to the reader. For each i ∈ A 1 , let ESub i (ϕ) be the least set containing Sub(ϕ) such that if E G ϕ ∈ Sub(ϕ) and i ∈ G, then K i ϕ ∈ ESub i (ϕ). It is easy to see that |ESub i (ϕ)| ≤ 2|Sub(ϕ)|, since we add at most one formula for each formula in |Sub(ϕ)|. Let S 1 i consist of all the subsets of ESub + i (ϕ) that are maximally consistent, and now let S 1 = ∪ i∈A 1 S 1 i . Note that, as modified, |S 1 | ≤ 2 2|ϕ| . Thus, this modification keeps us safely within the desired exponential time bounds.
We keep the definition of K i unchanged for i ∈ A 2 (i.e., (s, t) ∈ K i iff s/K i ⊆ t), but we need to modify it for i ∈ A 1 . We redefine K i for i ∈ A 1 by defining (s, t) ∈ K i iff s/K i ∪ {K i ψ :
. It is easy to check that this modification forces the K i relations to be transitive. We force all the K i relations to be reflexive just as with M r A , by eliminating s ∈ S 1 if (s, s) / ∈ K i for some i ∈ A 1 ∪ A 2 . The remainder of the constructioneliminating the states that do not seem consistent-is unchanged.
We now need to show that the algorithm is correct. First suppose that ϕ is satisfiable in M rt
. We can associate with each state s ∈ S and i ∈ A 1 the state s * i in S 1 i consisting of all the formulas ψ ∈ ESub i (ϕ) such that (M, s) |= ψ. It is easy to see that if (s, t) ∈ K ′ i then (s * j , t * i ) ∈ K i for all j. 3 Using this observation, a straightforward induction shows that the states s * i for s ∈ S always seem consistent, and thus are in S j for all j and all i ∈ A 1 . Moreover, ϕ ∈ (s 0 ) * i for all i ∈ A 1 . Thus, the algorithm will declare that ϕ is satisfiable, as desired. Conversely, suppose that the algorithm declares that ϕ is satisfiable. We construct a struc-
in which ϕ is satisfied just as Theorem 4.5. Our modified construction guarantees that the K ′ i relations are all reflexive and the ones in A 1 are transitive.
We are almost ready to prove Theorem 3.4 for M rt A . However, we first we need to characterize the complexity of translating from ϕ to ϕ σ 2 . In particular, we need a bound on the number of elements in R(G 1 ϕ ) and the number of oracle calls required to compute them. To do this, we first define two auxiliary sequences of sets . If H ∈ J , then clearly H ∈ D m . Thus, without loss of generality, H ∈ J m i+1 − J , which means that |H| ≤ m. Let H ′ be the union of all sets 3 Note that it is not necessarily the case that (s * j , t * j ′ ) ∈ Ki for j ′ = i. For example, suppose ϕ is the formula EGp, i ∈ G ∩ A1, and M is such that (M, s) |= EGp ∧ p, (M, t) |= ¬EGp ∧ p, and (s, t) ∈ Ki. Then for i = j, j ′ and j / ∈ G, we have s * j = {EGp, p} and t * Since H ′ is finite, it can be written as a finite union of sets in D m , say of H 1 = H 1 , . . . , H k . Since H ∈ J m i+1 −J , H = G−∪H 2 for some G ∈ J and H 2 ⊆ J m i . By the induction hypothesis, there exists some H 3 ⊆ D m such that ∪H 2 = ∪H 3 . There must exist some set H 4 ⊇ H 1 ∪ H 3 such that (G, H 4 ) ∈ R(D m ). But then H − H ′ ⊇ G − ∪H 4 ∈ D m , and we obtain the desired contradiction.
It now easily follows that R(J
The following result will be used to help compute the elements of R m (J ). Clearly the two claims in part (e) are equivalent. We prove the second. As observed in the proof of (c), every set in E m is an atom A over J . It is easy to see that there are no atoms in E m where all n sets in J appear negatively, since every set in E m is a nonempty subset of some G ∈ J . (This can be proved by induction on i for each E m i .) We prove by induction on i that if A ∈ E m and n − i sets appear negatively in A for i ≥ 1, then A ∈ E m i . Clearly if i = 1, then A = G − (H 1 ∪ . . . ∪ H n−1 ), and H = {H 1 , . . . , H n−1 } is a G-maximal subset of J . Thus, (G, H) ∈ D m 1 and A ∈ E m 1 . Suppose that the result is true if i = k and suppose that n − (k + 1) sets appear negatively in A. As A ∈ E m , there must be some minimal j such that A ∈ E m j+1 . By definition, A = A H for some (G, H) ∈ R(D m j ). By (d), either A = G − (∪H ′ ∪ E m j ) and H ′ ⊆ J or A ∈ E m j . The latter case contradicts our choice of m, so we may assume that A = G − (∪H ′ ∪ E m j ) and H ′ ⊆ J . It is easy to see that H ′ must consist of precisely the sets in J that appear negatively in A. (If it did not include all the sets that appear negatively in A then H ′ ∪ E m j would not be a G-maximal subset of J ∪ E m j ; if it includes any sets that appear postively then A would be empty.) Let E ′ consist of all the atoms A ′ in E m j in which the set of sets in J that appear negatively in A ′ is a strict superset of H ′ . It is easy to see that
, since all the sets in E m j − E ′ must be disjoint from G − ∪H ′ . (This is clear for the B ∈ E m j − E ′ for which some set appearing negatively in A does not appear negatively in B. On the other hand, if the same sets appear negatively in B as in A then B = A and we contradict the minimality of j.) By the induction hypothesis,
We remark that a simpler proof, just using the fact that there are at most 2 n atoms over J , can be used to show that E m n ′ = E m 2 n for n ′ > 2 n . This simpler proof would suffice for the purposes of this subsection. However, we shall use the added information in (e) in Section 4.5.
Proof of Theorem 3.4 for M rt
A : Again, the lower bound follows from standard results in [HM92] .
For the upper bound, suppose that we are given a formula ϕ such that n = |ϕ| and H ∈ A ϕ,rt . By definition, there exists a G such that (G, H) ∈ R(G 1 ϕ ). By Lemma 4.10,
. Thus, we can uniquely characterize H by a pair (H ′ , X), where H ′ = H ∩ G ϕ and X = E 1 n (G ϕ ) − H (so that X is either the empty set or a singleton). It should be clear that we can compute compute the set E 1 n (G ϕ ) in time O(n 2 2 cn ) and which of these (at most 2 2n + 2 n ) pairs is in A 1 and A 2 using at most 2n(2 2n + 2 n ) calls to the oracle O 1 .
By Lemmas 4.4(a) and 4.11, we can similarly compute the formula ϕ σ 2 in time O(2 cn ) using O(2 cn ) oracle calls. We now apply Proposition 4.8 and Theorem 4.9, just as we applied Proposition 4.1 and Theorem 4.5 in the case of M A .
We next want to prove Theorem 3.1 for M rt A . Just as with M A and M r A , we want to pull a proof of ϕ σ 2 back to a proof of σ. However, it is no longer true that we can necessarily prove ϕ σ 2 using only the modal operators that appear in ϕ σ 2 . We may also need to use K H for H ∈ A 1 . Fortunately, this does not cause us problems. The following extension of Lemma 4.6 is immediate. Let (S4 C G ) A 1 +A 2 consist of the axioms in (T C G ) + (so that, in particular, E5 is included), together with every instance of K4 (
there is a proof of ψ in (S4 C G ) A 1 +A 2 using only the modal operators that appear in ϕ and K i for i ∈ A 1 .
Lemma 4.13: If A is finite and ϕ ∈ L C
G is valid with respect to M rt
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Lemma 4.7 for M r A , except that since the definition of the K i relation is different, we must still check that the results still hold with the modified definition.
Suppose that s ∈ S j does not seem consistent because ¬E G ψ ∈ s and there is no state t ∈ S j such that (s, t) ∈ ∪ i∈G K i and ¬ψ ∈ t. We want to show that (S4
As before this suffices.
For each i ∈ G and, by induction, each j, we have a provable equivalence for ψ similar to the one before: (S4
So it suffices to find, for each such i and each t ∈ S j i with ¬ψ ∈ t, a G i,t containing i such that (S4
, this follows just as before. For i ∈ A 1 , we show that (S4
By our assumption (s, t) / ∈ K i . Thus, there exists some formula θ ∈ s/K i ∪ {K i θ :
We cannot have K i θ ∈ t, for then (since (t, t) ∈ K i , so t/K i ⊆ t) we would have θ ∈ t ∩ t/K i , contradicting our choice of θ. Thus we must have that ¬K i θ ∈ t. It follows that (S4
Finally, we must show that if ¬C G ψ ∈ s and there is no state t ∈ S j G-reachable from s in S j such that ¬ψ ∈ t, then S4
This argument is identical to that given in the proof of Lemma 4.7, so we do not repeat it here.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 for M rt
A : Again, we have already observed that the axioms are sound. For completeness, suppose that ϕ is valid with respect to M A . By Proposition 4.8, ϕ σ 2 is valid with respect to M rt
. By Lemma 4.13, there is a proof of ϕ σ 2 in K C Gϕ that mentions only the modal operators in ϕ σ 2 and the operators K H for H ∈ A 1 . Using Lemma 4.12, it follows that we can pull this back to a proof of ϕ in S4 C G .
Dealing with M rst A

M rst
A and M elt A introduce additional complications. The translation used in Proposition 4.8 no longer suffices. We need to deal with the fact that in M rst A , we can test not only that whether a set is a singleton, but whether it has size k for any k. Given a formula ϕ, suppose that |ϕ| = n. We want to map A to a finite set of agents and prove an analogue of Propositions 4.8. The obvious analogue of A ϕ,rt would be to consider the sets H such that (G, H) ∈ R(G n ϕ ). We essentially do this, except that we replace all sets of cardinality ≤ n by the singletons in them.
Given a set J of subsets of
, |G − ∪H| = 1}; let A 2 = A ϕ,rst − A 1 . Define σ 3 : A → A 1 ∪ A 2 as before: σ 3 (i) = H if i ∈ A H and σ 3 (i) is undefined otherwise. Much as before, we define τ 3 (H) = ∩( G n ϕ − H). Since it is easy to see that R( G n ϕ ) = R(G ψ ) for some appropriately chosen ψ, it is immediate that Lemma 4.4 applies without change to σ 3 and τ 3 .
Lemma 4.14: If H ∈ A 2 , then |A H | ≥ n + 1.
Proof: Suppose, by way of contradiction, that H ∈ A 2 and 1 ≤ |A H | ≤ n. We must have
ϕ . This contradicts the fact that H is G-maximal, because if H ′ is H together with one of these singleton subsets, we must have G − ∪H ′ = ∅.
Proposition 4.15: ϕ is satisfiable in M rst
A iff ϕ σ 3 is satisfiable in M rst
As the union of symmetric relations is symmetric, the proof that this works is essentially identical to that in Lemma 4.8 for the case of M rt A . For the opposite direction, suppose that (M, s) |= ϕ σ 3 for some M = (S, π,
. We must construct a structure M ′ ∈ M rst A that satisfies ϕ. The state space for the structure M ′ will again consist of copies of S, but two copies no longer suffice to guarantee that the K i relations are equivalence relations. In fact, we use countably many copies.
By Lemma 4.14, for each H ∈ A 2 , there exist at least n + 1 agents in A H . Choose n + 1 such agents, and call them i 0 H , . . . , i n H . Partition A H into n + 1 disjoint sets G H,j with i j H ∈ G H,j . We build copies of M in a tree-like manner. We index the copies of M with strings of the form ((s 1 , t 1 ), i 1 , . . . , (s k , t k ), i k ), such that s j , t j ∈ S, i j is i j ′ H for some H ∈ A 2 and 0 ≤ j ′ ≤ n, (s j , t j ) ∈ K H , and i j = i j+1 . Roughly speaking, between M σ and M σ·((s k ,t k ),i k ) we have edges for the K i relations for {i} ∈ A 1 and also edges between s k and t k in K i k ; however, there are no edges in K j if {j} / ∈ A 1 and j = i k ; moreover, there are no other edges in K i k except those required to assure reflexivity.
Before we can construct M ′ , we need some preliminary observations. We can suppose that the states in S are numbered. Thus, for each state s ∈ S, if (M, s) |= ¬C G ψ, there is a lexicographically minimal shortest path (s 0 , . . . , s k ) such that (s i , s i+1 ) ∈ K H for some H ∈ G and (M, s k ) |= ¬ψ. Note that, for each i ≤ k, (M, s i ) |= ¬C G ψ and (s i , . . . , s k ) is also the lexicographically minimal shortest G-path from s i leading to a state that satisfies ¬ψ. For each s ∈ S and B = E or C, let ¬B G 1 ψ 1 , . . . , ¬B G k ψ k be the formulas in Sub + (ϕ) such that (M, s) |= (¬B G j ψ j ) σ 3 . For each state s ∈ S, we can associate a set F (s) of at most n pairs (H, t) such that (s, t) ∈ K H and for every formula B G ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ), if (M, s) |= (¬B G ψ) σ 3 , then there exists a pair (H, t) ∈ F (s) such that t is the first state after s on the lexicographically minimal σ 3 (G j )-path from s to a state satisfying ¬ψ.
We can now define a set Σ of strings inductively. Let Σ 0 be the empty string. Suppose that we have constructed Σ k consisting of strings ((s 1 , t 1 ), i 1 , . . . , (s k , t k ), i k ) with the properties given above. For each σ = ((s 1 , t 1 ), i 1 
, there is exactly one string σ · ((s, t), i) ∈ Σ k+1 . We choose i ∈ A H in such a way that i = i k , i is one of i 0 H , . . . , i n H , and a different i is chosen for each (H, t) ∈ F (s). Since |F (s)| ≤ n and we can choose among n + 1 agents i H 0 , . . . , i H n , this can clearly be done. Let Σ = ∪ k Σ k . Let M ′ = (S ′ , π ′ , {K i : i ∈ A}) be defined as follows:
• S ′ = ∪ σ∈Σ S σ , where each S σ is a disjoint copy of S. We denote by s σ the copy of state s ∈ S in S σ .
• π ′ (s σ ) = π(s) for s ∈ S, σ ∈ Σ.
K i is clearly reflexive, symmetric, and transitive in this case, since K σ 3 (i) is.
• If σ 3 (i) = H ∈ A 2 and i ∈ G H,j , then
Again, it is clear from the construction that K i is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive.
• If σ 3 (i) is undefined, then K i = {(s σ , s σ ) : s ∈ S, σ ∈ Σ)}. Of course, in this case K i is also reflexive, symmetric, and transitive.
We claim that for each formula ψ ∈ Sub + (ϕ), the following are equivalent:
The argument proceeds by a straightforward induction on the structure of ψ. The argument that (a) implies (b) is easy using the induction hypothesis, and the implication from (b) to (c) is trivial. For the argument that (c) implies (a), the only interesting cases are when ψ is of the form
the argument is easy because it is easy to see that
For suppose not. Then there is some (H, t) ∈ F (s) such that H ∈ σ 3 (G) and (s, t) ∈ K H . Our construction guarantees that σ ′ = σ · ((s, t), i) ∈ Σ for some i ∈ A H . From Lemmas 4.3(a) and 4.4(a), it follows that i ∈ G. Moreover, by our construction, (s σ , t σ ′ ) ∈ K i . The induction hypothesis now guarantees that (M ′ , t σ ′ ) |= ¬ψ ′ . But this contradicts the assumption that
Finally, suppose that (M ′ , s σ ) |= C G ψ ′ . Again, for a contradiction, suppose that (M, s) |= ¬(C G ψ ′ ) σ 3 . Now we proceed by a subinduction on the length of the shortest σ 3 (G)-path in M leading to a state satisfying (¬ψ ′ ) σ 3 to show that (M ′ , s σ ) |= ¬C G ψ ′ . We leave the straightforward details to the reader.
Next, we want an analogue of Theorem 4.9 for M rst A . The reader will not be surprised to learn that there are new complications here as well, although the basic result still holds. Proof: We start as in the proof of Theorem 4.9. Again, we assume for ease of exposition that A 1 = ∅. For i ∈ A 1 , let S 1 i consist of all the subsets of ESub + i (ϕ) that are maximally consistent and let S 1 = ∪ i∈A 1 S 1 i . The definition of the K i relations depends on whether i ∈ A 1 or i ∈ A 2 . For i ∈ A 1 , we define the K i relations on S 1 so that (s, t)
It is easy to check that this modification forces these K i relations to be Euclidean and transitive. For i ∈ A 2 we define K i so that (s, t) ∈ K i iff s/K i ⊆ t and t/K i ⊆ s. Clearly this modification forces these K i relations to be symmetric. We force all the K i relations to be reflexive just as with M r A , by eliminating s ∈ S 1 if (s, s) / ∈ K i for some i ∈ A 1 ∪ A 2 .
We now must also change the definition of s seeming consistent. Define the relations i on S 1 × S 1 i by taking
Suppose that we have defined S 1 , . . . , S m . S m+1 consists of all states s ∈ S m that seem consistent, in that the following three conditions hold (where we assume that all states considered are in S m ):
1. For all i ∈ A 1 , there exists an s ′ ∈ S j such that s i s ′ .
2. There exist distinct agents i 1 , . . . , i k ∈ A 1 and states s 1 , . . . , s k such that s i h s h for h ∈ {1, . . . , k} and for every formula of the form ¬E G ψ ∈ s, there is a t such that either
3. If ¬C G ψ ∈ s then there exist states s 0 , s ′ 0 , s 1 , s ′ 1 , . . . , s k such that s = s 0 , ¬ψ ∈ s k , and there exist j 0 , . . . , j k−1 in G such that, for each i ≤ k, (s ′ i , s i+1 ) ∈ K j i and either j i ∈ A 2 and s i = s ′ i or j i ∈ A 1 , s i j i s ′ i and s ′ i is acceptable for s i , where we say that s ′ is acceptable for s if there are states s h and agents i h , h = 1, . . . , k, as described in condition 2 for s, and s ′ = s i for some i ≤ k.
We need to show that we can check whether s seems consistent in time O(|A|2 |ϕ| ). The only difficulty is to determine, for given s and s ′ , if s ′ is acceptable for s. It is clear that k ≤ |ϕ|, since we need at most one state and agent for each formula of the form ¬E G ψ ∈ s. However, if we simply check each subgroup of states containing s ′ and of agents containing j where s ′ ∈ S 1 j that are of size ≤ |ϕ| in the naive way, this check will take time at least C(2 |ϕ| , |ϕ|)C(|A|, |ϕ|) (where C(n, k) is n choose k), which is unacceptable for our desired time bounds. Instead, we proceed as follows.
Suppose that s ′ ∈ S 1 i 1 and s i 1 s ′ . (If it is not the case that s i 1 s ′ , then clearly s ′ is not acceptable for s ′ .) Let F (s, s ′ ) consist of all formulas E G ψ such that
Intuitively, F (s, s ′ ) consists of the potentially "problematic" formulas that may prevent s ′ from being acceptable for s.
We construct sets B 1 , . . . , B N of subsets of F (s, s ′ ) with the property that a set X ∈ B k iff there exist states t 1 , . . . , t k such that s i j t j for j = 1, . . . , k , t 1 = s ′ and, for each formula E G ψ ∈ X, there exists a j such that ¬K i j ψ ∈ t j . Given a state t ∈ S 1 i , let
Intuitively, F t (s, s ′ ) consists of the formulas in F (s, s ′ ) that can be "taken care of" by state t.
It is easy to check that B k+1 has the required property. Moreover, we can compute the sets B 1 , . . . , B N in time O(2 cn ). To see this, note that since |F (s, s ′ )| ≤ |ϕ|, clearly |B j | ≤ 2 |ϕ| . Thus, given B k , we can clearly compute B k+1 in time O(2 cn ) for some c > 0. Since N < |ϕ| 2 , the result follows. Finally, we claim that s ′ is acceptable for s iff F (s, s ′ ) ∈ B N . Clearly if F (s, s ′ ) / ∈ B N , then it is almost immediate from the definition that s ′ is not acceptable for s. Conversely, if F (s) ∈ B N , then there exist states t 1 , . . . , t N such that s ′ = t 1 , s i j t j and, for each formula in E G ψ ∈ F (s), there exists j such that K i j ψ ∈ t j . We clearly do not need all of these states and agents; we just need at most one for each formula in F (s, s ′ ). That is, there exists a set A ′ of agents (contained in {i 1 , . . . , i N }) with |A ′ | ≤ |F (s, s ′ )| and a state u i corresponding to each agent i ∈ A ′ (contained in {t 1 , . . . , t N }) such that for each formula E G ψ ∈ F (s, s ′ ), there exists an agent i ∈ A ′ such that s i u i and ¬K i ψ ∈ u i . We now wish to extend A ′ to a set showing that s ′ is acceptable for s. If we consider any ¬E G ψ ∈ s, either condition 2(a) is satisfied or there is already an i ∈ A ′ satisfying 2(b) or |A(s, s ′ , E G ψ)| ≥ |ϕ|. In the last case, it is immediate that we can extend A ′ to include an agent satisfying 2(b) for E G ψ.
To show that this algorithm is correct, first suppose that ϕ is satisfiable. In that case, (M, s 0 ) |= ϕ for some structure M = (S, π, {K ′ i : i ∈ A}) ∈ M rst . As for M rt , we can associate with each state s ∈ S and i ∈ A 1 the state s * i in S 1 i consisting of all the formulas ψ ∈ ESub i (ϕ) such that (M, s) |= ψ. It is easy to see that if (s, t) ∈ K ′ i then (s * i , t * i ) ∈ K i . Using this observation, a straightforward induction shows that the states s * i for s ∈ S always seem consistent, and thus are in S j for all j and all i ∈ A 1 . Moreover, ϕ ∈ (s 0 ) * i for all i ∈ A 1 . Thus, the algorithm will declare that ϕ is satisfiable, as desired.
For the converse, we need to show that if the algorithm declares that ϕ is satisfiable, then it is indeed satisfiable in M rst
. We need to work a little harder than in the previous proofs. Now we can no longer just view the object constructed by our algorithm as the required structure. Rather, it serves as a "blueprint" for building the required structure.
Suppose that the algorithm terminates at stage N with a state u ∈ S iu = S N iu containing ϕ. Before we go on, we make one observation that will prove useful in the sequel. Notice that if
• s i j s j for all i, j ∈ A 1 and
• for every formula of the form ¬E G ψ ∈ ∪ i∈A 1 s i , there exists an agent j ∈ G and a state t ∈ S N such that ¬ψ ∈ t and either j ∈ A 1 ∩ G, ¬K j ψ ∈ s j , and (s j , t) ∈ K j or j ∈ A 2 and (s i , t) ∈ K j for some i ∈ A 1 (and hence (s i , t) ∈ K j for all i ∈ A 1 ).
By consistency condition 2, every state s ∈ S N must be a component of some (perhaps many) complete states.
Define a structure M * = (S * , π * , {K * i : i ∈ A 1 ∪ A 2 } as follows:
• S * consists of all complete states;
• π * ( s)(p) = true iff p ∈ ∪ i∈A 1 s i ;
• ( s, t) ∈ K * i for i ∈ A 2 iff (s j , t j ) ∈ K i for some j ∈ A 1 (it is easy to check that if (s j , t j ) ∈ K i for some j ∈ A 1 then (s j , t j ) ∈ K j for all j ∈ A 1 ).
It is easy to check that M * ∈ M rst A 1 +A 2
. We now show that for all ψ ∈ ∪ i∈A i ESub
We proceed, as usual, by induction on the structure of ψ. If ψ is a primitive proposition, a conjunction, or a negation, the argument is easy. Suppose that ψ is of the form E G ψ ′ . If E G ψ ′ ∈ ∪ i∈A 1 s i , then the construction of the K j relations guarantees that ψ ′ ∈ ∪ i∈A 1 t i for all t ∈ S * such that ( s, t) ∈ K * j for some j ∈ G. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, we have that (M * , s) |= E G ψ ′ . For the converse, suppose that ¬E G ψ ′ ∈ ∪ i∈A 1 s i . Then from the definition of complete state and consistency condition 2, there must be some complete state t and j ∈ G such that ( s, t) ∈ K j and ¬ψ ′ ∈ ∪ i∈A 1 t i .
Finally, suppose that ψ is of the form
must also be in ∪ i∈A 1 s i , an easy induction on the length of the path shows that for every complete state t G-reachable from s, we must have ψ ′ ∈ ∪ i∈A 1 t i so, by the induction hypothesis, we have (M * , s) |= C G ψ ′ . For the converse, suppose that ¬C G ψ ∈ ∪ i∈A 1 s i . Then ¬C G ψ ∈ s j for some (in fact, all) j ∈ A 1 . If G ∩ A 1 = ∅, choose j ∈ G ∩ A 1 ; otherwise, choose j ∈ G arbitrarily. From consistency condition 3, it easily follows that there exist complete states s 0 , . . . , s k and j 0 , . . . , j k−1 ∈ G such that s
, and it follows from our initial observation that ( s, s 1 ) ∈ K * j 0 . In either case, s k is G-reachable from s, so (M * , s) |= ¬C G ψ ′ , as desired.
We can now prove Theorem 3.4 for M rst A .
Proof of Theorem 3.4 for M rst A : Again, the lower bound follows from standard results in [HM92] .
For the upper bound, suppose that we are given a formula ϕ such that n = |ϕ|. We can compute the set E m n (G ϕ ) defined just before Lemma 4.11 in time O(n 2 2 cn ), using at most n 2 2 n calls to the oracle O m , just as we computed E 1 (G ϕ ). Similarly, we can characterize the sets H such that (G, H) is in R(G m ϕ ) = R m (G ϕ ) by a pair (H ′ , X), where H ′ ⊆ G ϕ and X is either ∅ or an element of E 1 m (G ϕ ) and compute which of the pairs actually represent sets in H such that (G, H) ∈ R(G m ϕ ) using at most 2n(2 2n + 2 n ) calls to the oracle O m . We cannot compute the individual elements of the sets A H such that |A H | ≤ m, but it does not matter. It suffices that we know the cardinality of these atoms (which our oracle will tell us). We now turn our attention to proving Theorem 3.1 for M rst A . Again, the basic structure is the same as for M A and M rt A .
Lemma 4.17: The mapping σ 3 (when viewed as a map with domain 2 A ) is injective on G n ϕ .
Let (S5 C G ) A 1 +A 2 consist of the axioms in (T C G ) + (including E5) together with E6 and every instance of K4 and K5 for i ∈ A 1 . We write (S5
+A 2 using only the modal operators that appear in ϕ and K i for i ∈ A 1 .
Lemma 4.18: If A is finite and ϕ ∈ L C
G is valid with respect to M rst
Proof: The proof is similar in spirit to that of Lemma 4.13 for M rt A , except that since we have a different definition of the K i relations and of seeming consistent, we must check that states eliminated under this definition are inconsistent. Again we must consider each of the three ways that a state s can be eliminated.
First, suppose that s ∈ S j and, for some i ∈ A 1 , there is no s ′ such that s i s ′ . As before, propositional reasoning shows that (S5
Next, suppose that s ∈ S j does not satisfy the second condition of seeming consistent. There must be a formula ¬E G ψ ∈ s such that 1. for all i ∈ A 2 and all t ∈ S j such that (s, t) ∈ K i , we have ψ ∈ t and 2. for all i ∈ G ∩ A 1 , and all t ∈ S j such that (s i , t) ∈ K i , we have ψ ∈ t.
Define an extension of s to be a vector s = (s i : i ∈ A 1 ) of states, where s i s i . Let EX(s) be the set of all extensions of s. If s is an extension of s, let ϕ s be the conjunction over all i ∈ A 1 of the formulas in ϕ s i . By straightforward propositional reasoning, we have (S5
by the second condition of seeming consistent, it suffices to show that (S5
So suppose that s ∈ EX(s). The proof follows the lines of the analogous argument in the proof of Lemma 4.13. As before, it suffices to find, for each i ∈ G and each t ∈ S j i with ¬ψ ∈ t, a set G i,t of agents containing i such that (S5
this follows as before if the reason that (s, t) / ∈ K i is that s/K i ⊆ t. If instead t/K i ⊆ s, then there is some E G ′ θ ∈ t with i ∈ G ′ such that ¬θ ∈ s and so ¬θ ∈ s i for each i. Thus (S5
That is, we can take G i,t = G ′ in this case.
For i ∈ A 1 , we show that (S5 C G ) A 1 +A 2 ⊢ ϕ ϕ s ⇒ K i ¬ϕ t (so that we can take G i,t = {i}). By our assumption, (s i , t) / ∈ K i for all t ∈ S i j . Thus, if t ∈ S i j , there is some formula θ such that either K i θ ∈ s i and ¬K i θ ∈ t or K i θ ∈ t and ¬K i θ ∈ s i . Here we are implicitly using the following facts: (1) if E G ′ θ ∈ s for some G ′ such that i ∈ G ′ then K i θ ∈ s i , since s i ∈ S 1 i , and similarly for t, (2) if K i θ / ∈ s, then ¬K i θ ∈ s, since s i ∈ S j i , and similarly for t, and (3) if K i θ ∈ s i then θ ∈ S since (s, s) ∈ K i , and similarly for t. If K i θ ∈ s and ¬K i θ ∈ t, it follows that (S5
The desired result now follows by standard arguments.
We have now shown that for all i ∈ G and t ∈ S i j such that ψ ∈ t, there exists some set G i,t with i ∈ G i,t such that (S5
Finally, if s ∈ S j does not satisfy the third condition of seeming consistent, the argument that (S5 C G ) A 1 +A 2 ⊢ ϕ ¬ϕ s is similar to that of Lemma 4.7. We replace G-reachability by the existence of sequences as in condition 3 in the definition of seeming consistent in Theorem 4.16 and note that we have essentially already proved the analogue of (6) from Lemma 4.7. We leave the remaining details to the reader.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 for M rst
A : The proof follows as for M rt A using the analogous lemmas proved above for M rst A .
Dealing with M elt A
For M elt A , we proceed much as for M rst A . There is one new subtlety. Consider the construction in the proof of Proposition 4.15, which uses σ 3 . Recall that σ 3 (i) may be undefined for some i. For such i, we defined K i to consist of all pairs (s σ , s σ ), making it reflexive. This approach will not work for M elt A . More precisely, the analogue of Proposition 4.15 for M elt A will not hold using this construction (even if we drop the reflexivity requirement). For example, if ϕ = ¬p∧E G 1 p∧E G 2 p and
but ϕ is not satisfied in the structure M ′ constructed in Proposition4.15, since for all i ∈ G 1 ∩G 2 , the construction will make K i reflexive. We solve this problem by defining a mapping σ 4 much like σ 3 , except that we ensure that σ 4 is never undefined.
Let B be the set of maximal subsets T of G ϕ such that ∩T = ∅ and such that the corresponding atom over G ϕ , A T = (∩T ) ∩ (∩ G∈Gϕ−T G) (= ∩T by the maximality of T ), is not one of the ones A H for H ∈ A ϕ,rst . Let A ϕ,elt = A ϕ,rst ∪ B, A 1 = B ∪ {H ∈ A ϕ,rst : |A H | = 1}, A 2 = A ϕ,elt − A 1 . The definitions of σ 4 : A → A ϕ,elt and τ 4 : A ϕ,elt → 2 A need some care. If i ∈ A H for some H ∈ A ϕ,rst , let σ 4 (i) = H as before. Otherwise, choose T ∈ B such that T ⊇ {G ∈ G ϕ : i ∈ G} and let σ(i) = T . Note that, by construction, σ 4 is defined for all i. For H ∈ A ϕ,rst , τ 4 (H) = ∩{ G n ϕ − H} as before. For T ∈ B, choose some i T ∈ A T (it does not matter which) and set τ 4 (T ) = {i T }.
Proposition 4.19: ϕ is satisfiable in M elt
A iff ϕ σ 4 is satisfiable in M elt
as before by defining K I = ∪{K i : i ∈ τ 4 (I)} for I ∈ A ϕ,elt . To apply Proposition 4.1, we need to show that ∪{τ (I) : I ∈ σ 4 (G)} = G for all G ∈ G ϕ . We know from the analysis of the M rst case that ∪{τ 3 (H) : H ∈ σ 3 (G)} = G for all G ∈ G ϕ . Since σ 4 (G) ⊇ σ 3 (G) and τ 4 (H) = τ 3 (H) for H ∈ A ϕ,rst , we have that ∪{τ 4 (I) : I ∈ σ 4 (G)} = ∪{τ 3 (H) : H ∈ σ 3 (G) ∪ ∪{τ 3 (I) : I ∈ σ 4 (G) − σ 3 (G)}. It is clear from the definitions, however, that if I ∈ σ 4 (G) − σ 3 (G), then there exists some i ∈ G such that I = σ 4 (i) and σ 3 (i) is undefined. Moreover, I = A T ⊆ G, so τ 4 (I) ∈ G. Thus, ∪{τ 3 (I) : I ∈ σ 4 (G) − σ 3 (G)} ⊆ G, so ∪{τ 4 (I) : I ∈ σ 4 (G)} = ∪{τ 3 (H) : H ∈ σ 3 (G)} = G, as desired. Applying Proposition 4.1, we get that to see that (M ′ , s) |= ϕ σ 4 .
It remains to verify that
. For this, we need to show that the K I relations for I ∈ A 1 are Euclidean, serial and transitive and that those in A 2 are serial and secondarily reflexive. For the ones in A 1 , note that τ 4 (I) is a singleton and so the desired properties hold since they hold for all agents in M . For the ones in A 2 , we just note that the union of serial relations is serial and the union of Euclidean relations is secondarily reflexive.
For the other direction, we proceed much as in the proof of Proposition 4.15. In addition to the concerns dealt with there for M rst , our primary new one is to make sure that the K i relations for all agents are serial. The problem arises for those i for which σ 3 (i) was undefined. The new agents in B are used to deal with this problem.
We proceed much as in Proposition 4.15, with two changes. First, we replace the automatic forcing of reflexivity by forcing secondary reflexivity for σ 3 (i) ∈ A 2 . Second, we modify the definition of the K i relation in M ′ as follows.
• If σ 4 (i) ∈ A 1 ∩ A ϕ,rst then, as before,
• If σ 4 (i) ∈ A 2 and i ∈ G H,j , then
Now note that every relation K i is Euclidean, serial and transitive. For the ones corresponding to agents in A 1 this is immediate from the fact that the agents in A 1 have these properties. For those with σ 4 (i) ∈ A 2 , seriality follows from the fact that the agents in A 2 are serial and the construction. Transitivity and the Euclidean property follow from the construction. In particular, if there is a K i edge coming into some t σ then there is none going out by construction except for the one from t σ to itself.
The verification that M ′ satisfies ϕ now proceeds as in Proposition 4.15. Proof: The argument here is like that for the M rst A 1 +A 2 case in Theorem 4.16. We keep the definition of K i for i ∈ A 1 and, as we noted there, this makes these relations Euclidean and transitive. We change the definition of K i for i ∈ A 2 by putting (s, t) in K i iff s/K i ⊆ t and t/K i ⊆ t. This latter definition clearly makes the K i secondarily reflexive for i ∈ A 2 . We ensure seriality by adding a clause to the definition of a state s seeming consistent: 4 For every agent i ∈ A 2 there is a state t such that (s, t) ∈ K i and for every agent i ∈ A 1 there are states s ′ and t such s i s ′ and (s ′ , t) ∈ K i .
The proof now proceeds as before.
Proof of Theorem 3.4 for M elt A : The argument here is essentially the same as for M rst A . Just note that using the oracle O ′ we can determine the members of B within the appropriate time bound and so compute ϕ σ 4 as required.
We now turn our attention to proving Theorem 3.1 for M elt A . The basic structure is the same as for M rst A .
Lemma 4.21: The mapping σ 4 (when viewed as a map with domain 2 A ) is injective on G n ϕ .
Let (KD45 C G ) A 1 +A 2 consist of the axioms in K C G together with K3, E4, E7, and every instance of K4 and K5 for i ∈ A 1 . We write (KD45 , then (KD45
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Lemma 4.18 for M rst A . Again we must check that all states eliminated in the construction are provably inconsistent, but now using the axioms of (KD45 C G ) A 1 +A 2 and the modified definition of the K i relations, and dealing with the additional clause in the definition of seeming consistent.
The argument for the first condition for seeming consistent is the same as that for M rst A . Before dealing with the second condition, we prove a fact that will also be useful in dealing with the fourth condition. Let T i = {t ∈ S j i : (t, t) ∈ K i }. It is easy to see that if t / ∈ T i , then (KD45
For if t / ∈ T i , then there exists E G θ ∈ t such that i ∈ G and ¬θ ∈ t. But then (E G θ ⇒ θ) ⇒ ¬ϕ t is propositionally valid (and so provable by Prop). Since (KD45
, we can easily obtain (13) using (4). Now suppose that s is eliminated because it does not satisfy the second condition for seeming consistent due to E G ψ. It again suffices to show that for each i ∈ G and t ∈ S j i such that ψ ∈ t, there is a set G i,t of agents containing i such that (KD45 C G ) A 1 +A 2 ⊢ ϕ ϕ s ⇒ E G i,t ¬ϕ t . First suppose i ∈ A 2 . If (s, t) / ∈ K i because s/K i ⊆ t then the argument given in Lemma 4.7 works to get a G i,t as desired. If s/K i ⊆ t but t/K i ⊆ t then the existence of the required G i,t is immediate from (13). Now suppose i ∈ A 1 and t is such that (s i , t) / ∈ K i . If s/K i ⊆ t, then there is some formula θ such that K i θ ∈ s i and ¬θ ∈ t; it easily follows that (KD45 C G ) A 1 +A 2 ⊢ ϕ ϕ s ⇒ K i ¬ϕ t , as required. If {K i θ : K i θ ∈ s} ⊆ t, then there is some θ such that K i θ ∈ s but ¬K i θ ∈ t; the result now easily follows using K4, just as in the argument for (S4 C G ) A 1 +A 2 . If both of these conditions hold (but still (s i , t) / ∈ K i ), then it must be that there is a θ with K i θ ∈ t and K i θ / ∈ s. In this case ¬K i θ ∈ s, and the result follows using K5, just as in the argument for (S5 C G ) A 1 +A 2 . The argument in the case that s is eliminated because it does not satisfy the third condition for seeming consistent is the same as in the proof of Lemma 4.18.
Finally, suppose that s does not satisfy the new (fourth) condition of seeming consistent. Then either
• there is an i ∈ A 2 for which there is no t with (s, t) ∈ K i or
• there is an i ∈ A 1 for which there is no pair s ′ , t such that s i s ′ and (s ′ , t) ∈ K i .
For the first case, for each t ∈ T i , it must be the case that s/K i ⊆ t, so that there must be some G i,t with i ∈ G i,t such that (KD45 C G ) A 1 +A 2 ⊢ ϕ s ⇒ E G i,t ¬ϕ t , as usual. By (13), for each t / ∈ T i , there is some G i,t with i ∈ G i,t such that (KD45 Proof of Theorem 3.1 for M elt A : The proof follows as for M rt A using the analogous lemmas proved above for M elt A . We must just show that E7 is derivable from the other axioms in KD45 C G . Suppose that i ∈ G 1 ∩ . . . G k . Then, using E1, KD45
It thus suffices to show that in KD45 C G , from ¬(ϕ 1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕ k ) we can infer ¬K i (ϕ ∧ . . . ∧ ϕ k ). But since ¬(ϕ 1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕ k ) is equivalent to (ϕ 1 ∧ . . . ϕ k ) ⇒ false, this follows easily using (4) and K3. σ 4 , we have also have to check whether G 1 ∩ . . . ∩ G k = ∅, but again, these are sets with simple descriptions if we allow intersection.) Thus, as long as we can check the required properties of sets described in terms of intersection and complementation relatively efficiently, then the queries to the oracle pose no problem. Unfortunately, the bounds in Proposition 3.3 depends on the descriptions involving only set difference and union, so we cannot get tight bounds for Theorem 3.4 (at least, with our current techniques) using descriptions that involve intersection and complementation. It remains an open question whether we can get tight bounds in all cases taking into account the cost of querying the oracle.
Conclusions
We have characterized the complexity of satisfiability for epistemic logics when the set of agents is infinite. Our results emphasize the importance of how the sets of agents are described and provide new information even in the case where the sets involved are finite.
In this paper we have focused on a language that has operators E G and C G . There are two interesting directions to consider extending our results.
• We could restrict the language so that it has only E G operators. If the set of agents is finite (and all sets G are presented in such a way that it is easy to check if i ∈ G), then there are well-known results that show the complexity of the decision problem in this case is PSPACE complete [HM92] . However, again, this result counts E G as having length |G|. Although we have not checked details, it seems relatively straightforward to combine the techniques of [HM92] with those presented here to get PSPACE completeness for L E G , taking E G to have length 1, using the same types of oracle calls as in Theorem 3.4. (Note that Proposition 3.3 applies to the language L E G ; we did not use the C G operators in this proof.)
• We could add the distributed knowledge operator D G to the language [FHMV95, FHV92, HM92] . Roughly speaking, ϕ is distributed knowledge if the agents could figure out that ϕ is true by pooling their knowledge together. Formally, we have (M, s) |= D G ϕ if (M, t) |= ϕ for all t ∈ ∩ i∈G K i (s).
It is known that if A is finite (and there is no difficulty in telling if i ∈ G), then adding D G to the language poses no essential new difficulties [FHMV95, HM92] . We can get a complete axiomatization, the satisfiability problem for the language with D G and E G operators is PSPACE complete, and once we add common knowledge, the satisfiability problem becomes exponential-time complete. Once we allow infinitely many agents, adding D G introduces new subtleties. For example, even if we place no assumptions on the K i relations, once we have both E G and D G in the language, we need to be able to distinguish between sets of cardinality one and those with larger cardinality since E G p ⇔ D G p is valid if and only if G is a singleton. New issues also arise once we make further assumptions about the K i relations because different properties are preserved for the new agents, say K A D and K A E , which are to be added on as in Proposition 3.5 to represent D A and E A , respectively. Intuitively, K A E corresponds to the union of the relations K i for i ∈ G while K A D corresponds to their intersection. Thus, while both K A D and K A E inherit reflexivity and symmetry from the K i relations, K A D inherits transitivity and the Euclidean property while K A E does not. There are also additional relations between these agents that must be taken into account. Examples in S4 and S5 include
These are issues for future work.
